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In Vitro Fertilization: Problems and
Solutions
By John Dwight Ingram*
I. Introduction
In recent decades sex without reproduction has become common and
widely accepted, and more recently medical science has made it
increasingly possible to have reproduction without sex. The former is
much more enjoyable than the latter for most of us and, while it does
entail some moral and legal issues, it is a great deal less complex than the
latter.' In this article I will present many of the social, ethical and legal
issues involved in in vitro2 fertilization (hereafter IVF), and discuss the
possible and preferable resolution of these questions.
II. Medical Background
It is now possible to extract ova from a woman and fertilize them
with male sperm in a laboratory container The fertilized ova may then
be reimplanted into the woman, or frozen for later implantation.4 This
technique often makes it possible for apparently infertile couples to
conceive and produce their own biological children.
Different medical facilities may vary the IVF process to some extent,
but the basic technique is essentially the same. Normally, a woman
produces only one egg during each menstrual cycle. To start the IVF
procedure, the woman is "given hormones to stimulate her ovaries to
produce multiple eggs."5 The eggs are then removed from her body in
a minor surgical procedure, and are placed in an appropriate growth
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1. See generally Alexander Morgan Captron, Alternative Birth Technologies:
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Challenges. 20 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 679, 686 (1987).
2. Literally: "in glass"; "outside the living body and in an artificial environment." WEBSTER'S
NEw COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1981).
3. Julia T. Bielawski, Custody of the Cryopreserved In Vitra Fertilized Embryo:
Minnesota Perspective, 12 HAMLINE J. PuB. L. & POL., 259, 259 (1991).
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4. Id.
5. Phyllis L. Bean, Note, Taking the Frozen Embryo to Court in Virginia: A Proposed Statute,
13 GEo. MASON U. L. REv. 127, 129 (1990).
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medium. 6 When the egg has matured, it is placed in a container with a
man's sperm, in hopes that fertilization will take place.7 In most cases,
one or more fertilized eggs will be transferred to the woman's uterus soon
after fertilization. 8 One study indicates that this will result in pregnancy
about 17% of the time, and a live birth about 11% of the time.9
The product of human conception is ordinarily called an "embryo"
from the time of fertilization until about eight weeks thereafter.' 0
Usually, after the embryos have reached the four- or eight-cell stage,
several are simultaneously inserted into the woman's body' to increase
the likelihood of successful implantation. As a general rule, no more
than three embryos are inserted at one time, "to reduce the risk of
multiple pregnancies."2 The unused embryos may then either be
13
discarded or frozen for later use.
Cryopreservation,"4 or freezing, of embryos allows a woman to
attempt implantation during several reproductive cycles without
undergoing the physical and financial burden of ovarian stimulation and
egg retrieval each time. 5 Because cryogenic storage of human embryos
is relatively new and experimental, there is some uncertainty and
disagreement as to how long an embryo may remain frozen and still
remain viable. Some sources suggest that there is no proof of viability

6. Id.
7. Id. Fertilization does not take place in over 90% of cases. John A. Robertson, Prior
Agreements for Disposition of Frozen Embryos, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 407, 407, n.3 (1990).
8. Id.
9. Kim Schaefer, In Vitro Fertilization, Frozen Embryos, and the Right to Privacy - Are
Mandatory Donation Laws Constitutional?,22 PAC. L.J. 87, 91 (1990).
10. Joseph J. Saltarelli, Genesis Retold: Legal Issues Raised by the Cryopreservation of
PreimplantationHuman Embryos, 36 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1021, 1023 n.8 (1985). Developmental
stages from that time until birth are usually called "fetal." David G. Dickman, Social Values in a
Brave New World: Toward a Public Policy Regarding Embryo Status and In Virto Fertilization,29
ST. Louis U. L.J. 817, 818 n.5 (1985). Although some writers refer to the conceptus as a
"preembryo" or "early embryo" prior to implantation, I will refer to it as an "embryo" when
discussing the pre-implantation stage. See, e.g., Patricia A. Martin & Martin L. Lagod, The Human
Embryo, The Progenitors,and The State: Towarda Dynamic Theory of Status, Rights, and Research
Policy, 5 HIGH TECH. L.J. 257, 258 (1990); John A. Robertson, In The Beginning: The Legal Status
of Early Embryos, 76 VA. L. REV. 437, 437 (1990).
11. Mario J. Trespalacios, Frozen Embryos: Towards an Equitable Solution, 46 U. MIAMi L.
REv. 803, 806 (1992). The embryos are inserted into either the uterus or the fallopian tubes. Id. at
806 n.15.
12. id.
13. Id.
14. It is well known that cryopreservation of embryos has been used successfully in cattle
breeding for many years. Marcia Joy Wurmbrand, Frozen Embryos: Moral, Social and Legal
Implications, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 1079, 1082 (1986).
15. Schaefer, supra note 9, at 87 n.4.
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beyond two years.1 6 Others state that, with proper maintenance, there
is no reason to expect deterioration for an unlimited time, 7 and that "the
embryo could remain frozen indefinitely." 8 This view is supported by
the fact that the Howard and Georgeanna Jones Institute for Reproductive
Medicine in Norfolk, Virginia "allows embryos to stay frozen throughout
the woman's reproductive years."' 9
The increasing use of cryopreservation will inevitably cause a large
number of embryos to be stored in clinics and other repositories
throughout the country, often for long periods of time. This will lead to
a number of difficult questions regarding control over use and disposition
of the embryos.
Couples most often use IVF "to overcome the man's low sperm
count or to bypass the woman's blocked or damaged fallopian tubes."20
Cryopreservation is used not only to facilitate future attempts at
pregnancy by these couples, as noted above, but for a number of other
reasons as well. Frozen embryos can be insurance for those who expect
exposure to radiation or other hazards.21 It can also give people much
greater "latitude in decisions of timing and family planning."22 For
example, young couples can create genetically healthy embryos, which
can be stored for use after education, career and financial goals are
completed or farther along the road.
III. Rights of Embryos, Creating Couple, and Medical Treatment
Facility
A. What Do We Mean By "Life"?
Much of the problem society has in trying to agree on "when life
begins" is derived from our failure to distinguish between "life", "human
life", and "a human life." Most people would agree that sperm, ova,
embryos, and fetuses are a form of "life" and probably "human life." In
these preliminary forms such matter holds the potential of becoming "a

16. See, e.g., Trespalacios, supra note 11, at 811 n.51.
17. Bielawski, supra note 3, at 261.
18. Bean, supra note 5, at 130.
19. Bean, supra note 5, at 130 n.36.
20. Wurmbrand, supra note 14, at 1082.
21. For example, an individual undergoing cancer therapy may wish to preserve reproductive
material before undergoing treatment. In the 1960s the Apollo astronauts banked their sperm before
missions in case space travel damaged their reproductive systems. E. Donald Shapiro, New
Innovations in Conception and Their Effects Upon Our Law and Morality, 31 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.

37, 44 (1986).
22. Schaefer, supra note 9, at 87.
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human being," or part thereof, just as an acorn has the potential to
become an oak tree.23 However, even the most ardent environmentalist
would probably not insist that all acorns receive the same respect and
protection as we usually give to oak trees.
To some extent, there seems to be a consensus that, at least in its
earliest forms, the potential for human life does not require societal
protection. Anti-abortion zealots have shown no interest in preventing
the destruction or abandonment of sperm or ova. Their efforts have been
directed only at embryos and fetuses.
As to embryos, at least at the early stage where they would be
prospects for cryopreservation, there is considerable doubt whether a
scientifically identifiable human being exists at the time of
fertilization. 24 The development of twins after fertilization suggests that
while an embryo may well constitute "human life," it does not constitute
"a human life" in measurable scientific terms.25 And as with an acorn,
whose loss does not concern us, the loss of an embryo
or very early
26 causes little if any grief.27
all,
at
noticed
if
miscarriage,
There simply "is no generally accepted list of characteristics which
define a 'human being. ' ' 28 Most people, especially those who believe
that "a human being" exists prior to birth, derive their belief from
religious dogma. In most religions, "a human life" exists when a "soul"
ispresent.29 However, there is a wide spectrum of views as to when
this vital event occurs.
B. When Does "Life" Begin?
In order to determine the status of embryos, and the rights and
protections that should apply to them, we must determine not only
whether they are "life" or "a human being," but also when they enter
each stage of development along the way from conception to birth. At
one end of the spectrum is the position of the Roman Catholic Church

23. Stephen C. Hicks, The Right to Life in Law: The Embryo and Fetus, the Body and Soul,
the Family and Society, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 805, 815 (1991).
24. Id. at 820.
25. Id. at 814.
26. Most such happenings in the first week or so of pregnancy are probably not even known
to the woman involved.
27. Hicks, supra note 23, at 820. 1 have never heard of a funeral being held or an obituary
being written following miscarriage, although when one occurs after the early weeks of pregnancy,
it will often cause sadness and frustration for the prospective parents.
28. Colleen M. Browne & Brian J. Hynes. The Legal Status of Frozen Embryos: Analysis and
ProposedGuidelinesfor a Uniform Law, 17 J. LEGIS. 97, 115 (1990).
29. Id. at 114-15.
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that life begins at conception. 30 At the other extreme is the belief of
most Jews that only at birth is there a new human life "of equal value to
the life of the mother., 31 Protestant theologians, adherents of other
religions, and those without a religious view on the subject have beliefs
that run the gamut from conception to birth.32
Both the legislative and judicial branches of one or more state
33
governments have taken the position that embryos are "human beings
and that the "life of each human being begins at conception." 34 While
the former position was reversed on appeal and the latter was held to be
extraneous to the abortion-restriction issues in Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services,35 there have been and will continue to be attempts to
put the force of law behind certain views on the beginning of life.36 In
Roe v. Wade,37 the United States Supreme Court declined "to speculate
as to the answer" 38 to when life begins, finding it necessary only to
recognize that "potential life" merits protection at some point.39
There does not seem to be any scientific basis for the belief that
human "life" begins at the moment of conception. Since a "person" is
usually thought to be a multicellular individual, it would be difficult to
argue that a "person" exists before the embryo reaches the eight-cell
stage, even though there may be genetic individuality before that time.'
C. What If "Life" Begins at Conception as a Matter of Law?
If it becomes the law that "life" with legal rights begins at
conception, embryos could not be destroyed, and perhaps it would even
be unlawful to allow embryos to die passively." It would also mean
"that any form of experimentation on a human embryo. . . that is likely

30. Shapiro, supra note 21, at 38.
31. Id.
32. See generally, id.
33. See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641 (Cir. Ct. Sept. 21,
1989), rev'd, No. 180, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 642 (Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1990).
34. Mo. REV. STAT. § 1.205.1 (1989).
35. 492 U.S. 490 (1989). The statement was in the preamble of the statute and did not by its
terms regulate abortion. Id. at 491.
36. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 9:129 (West 1986). "A viable in vitro fertilized human
ovum is a juridical person which shall not be intentionally destroyed by any natural or other juridical
person or through the actions of any other such person." Id.
37. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
38. Id. at 159.
39. Id. at 162.
40. Barbara Gregoratos, Note, Tempest in the Laboratory: Medical Research on Spare Embryos
from In Vitro Fertilization,37 HASTINGS L.J. 977, 985 (1986).
41. This might constitute "child neglect."
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to damage or endanger that embryo '42 would be prohibited. 4' Either
IVF would have to be banned, or all embryos would have to be implanted
in a uterus. But the latter would be a futility, because as long as the right
to abortion is constitutionally protected, a woman could simply implant
the embryo and then abort it.
Even most of those who believe that life begins at conception do not
take an absolute position against any destruction of an embryo or fetus.
The 1991 Louisiana abortion statute," for example, provides for an
exception where pregnancy is the result of rape or incest. If an embryo
or fetus is really "a human being", its destruction could not be permitted
for any reasons except to save the life of the mother. Therefore, unless
we as a society adopt the position of the ultra-extremists as to when life
begins and the consequences thereof, we should leave most decisions
regarding IVF to the participating couple, and to the medical facility and
medical professionals who are involved with them.
D. AppropriateStatutory Provisions
The force of law, in the form of statutory regulation, should be
employed only: (1) as a back-up to provide for situations where the
parties directly involved have not made their own contractual
arrangements; (2) to expressly authorize arrangements that may have been
considered illegal in the past; (3) to relieve involved parties from parental
or other responsibilities, where that is appropriate; and (4) to provide for
problems of inheritance.
A statute should expressly require that the parties directly involved
in IVF - the potential parental couple and the clinic or other medical
facility - must enter into a complete and binding agreement covering
every possible issue that can be foreseen. 45 The parties should be free
to make any provisions they wish unless those provisions are clearly
contrary to public policy, and no provision should be deemed contrary to
public policy merely because it is offensive to the beliefs, religious or
otherwise, of some people. It is important to make it clear that advance
provisions concerning embryos will be legally binding and enforceable,
so that all concerned will "know with reasonable certainty" what will
happen "if certain contingencies occur." 4 Those who are involved in

42. Gregoratos, supra note 40, at 984.
43. Id. Research or experimentation intended to benefit the embryo should be permitted,
however.
44. 1991 La. Acts 26.
45. See infra Part V for a discussion of the issues that should be addressed in the agreement.
46. Christi D. Ahnen, Disputes Over Frozen Embryos: Who Wins, Who Loses, and How Do
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IVF procedures must be able to rely on the agreements that they make.
If the parties know that the agreement is binding and enforceable, the
number of disputes will be greatly diminished.47
IV. Status of an Embryo
As discussed above, if a "human being" exists from conception
onward, an embryo would be entitled to all the rights and protections
afforded to other human beings.48 However, since such a belief at
present has no clear scientific basis, and is almost universally based on
religious dogma, it would be improper to incorporate it into the law.49
The decisions of the Supreme Court to date have denied to embryos and
early fetuses the status of "a human being."5
Some believe that an embryo should be treated essentially as a form
of property. 5 1 For those who adhere to this view, whoever "owns" an
embryo could use or dispose of it in any way he or she chooses. Many
people, however, would accord to an embryo a somewhat higher status
because of its potential to become a human being. 2 Yet although ova
and sperm have the potential to become persons, or an acorn to become
an oak, the mere potential for achieving personhood should not carry with
it any rights or duties. 3 Only thirty to forty percent of embryos
conceived by means of sexual intercourse will become live human
infants.54 We seldom give any thought to those embryos that fail to
survive within a woman's body - indeed we are usually not even aware
of them. There is no reason to extend any greater or different concern
for those embryos which are outside a woman's body.
It can be argued that Roe v. Wade established "that the state does not
have a compelling interest in protecting the life of a fetus until the fetus
is considered viable. ' 55 Clearly, if one accepts this proposition, it would
We Decide?, 24 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1299, 1345 (1991).
47. Id.
48. See supra Part III.C.
49. An embryo lacks "the usual attributes of personhood" - "the cognitive ability to interact,
be conscious, and experience emotions." Dena Beth Langley, In Vitro Fertilization: Eliminating the
Current State of Limbo Between Pre-embryonic Rights and the Fundamental Right to Procreate, 26
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1217, 1235 (1991).
50. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 569, n.13 (1989) (Stevens, J.,
concurring & dissenting) ("No member of this Court has ever questioned the holding in Roe ... that
a fetus is not a 'person' within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
51. John A. Robertson, Embryos, Families and Procreative Liberty: The Legal Structure ofthe
New Reproduction, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 939, 972 (1986).
52. Schaefer, supra note 9, at 96.
53. Robertson, supra note 10, at 445-46.
54. Ahnen, supra note 46, at 1312.
55. Anthony John Cuva, The Legal Dimensions of In Vitro Fertilization: Cryopreserved

98

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

FALL

1993

be difficult to argue that the state has any legitimate interest in the use or
disposition of an embryo. However, it is doubtful if Roe can properly be
considered authority for such a position. Roe simply said that whatever
interest the state might have in a nonviable fetus was outweighed by the
privacy interest of the woman bearing the fetus.56
IVF is different from the abortion issue involved in Roe, because in
IVF a woman's body, and her privacy right in the use of her body, is not
involved prior to implantation of the embryo. However, another very
important privacy interest is involved in the use and disposition of in
vitro embryos - the same interest that has been consistently protected by
the Supreme Court in cases involving contraception and abortion. This
privacy interest involves the right to decide whether and when to have
children, free from interference by the state.57 It would be illogical to
protect this interest as to abortion and contraception, but not as to IVF.
Requiring implantation would also be an utter futility since, as previously
stated, so long as abortion is legally available, an unwanted embryo could
be promptly aborted.
Thus, it seems best for the state to allow maximum freedom of
choice to those involved in IVF, and to limit itself to: (1) requiring that
the parties have a clear and comprehensive agreement; (2) providing for
situations where there is not an agreement; and (3) eliminating existing
legal impediments to freedom of choice.
V. Provisions for the Agreement of the Parties
The agreement between a couple and the medical facility which will
administer the IVF procedure should anticipate and provide for as many
future contingencies as possible. By now there has been enough
experience in this field to foresee most of the problems that can arise.
Among the most important are:
(1) death, divorce, or disability of the creators of the embryos;
(2) loss of interest by the creators in continuing to attempt
pregnancy through IVF;
(3) right of creators to remove embryos from the medical facility
and transfer them to another medical facility; and
(4) dispositional choices:
implantation, discard, division, or
donation to another couple or for research.

Embryos Frozen in Legal Limbo, VIII J. HUM. RTs. 383, 390 (1991).
56. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162-64 (1973).
57. See Schaefer, supra note 9, at 102-03 and cases cited therein.
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The agreement must be binding on all parties to it - the creating
couple and the medical facility - and subject to modification only if all
parties agree. Those involved will usually enter into the agreement and
participate in the procedure only if they can rely with certainty that its
provisions will be carried out. Some parties will have strong feelings
about the discard of embryos, and must be able to insist on implantation.
Others may want to ensure that their genetic offspring will not be born
after their death or divorce. Since it is my belief that the state has no
legitimate interest in deciding any of the questions involved in IVF,
sound policy dictates that whatever provisions the parties agree to should
be legally binding and enforceable just as with any other contract.
A. Right of Control Over the Embryos
Although frozen embryos are "not property in the traditional
sense,"58 there seems to be a growing consensus toward the view that
they should at least be subject to the right of their creators to make all
decisions as to their use and disposition."9 IVF is an expensive
proposition, with cost estimates ranging from $5,000 to $25,000,6 0 and
the creators of embryos have a legitimate interest in protecting and
controlling their investment.
As Professor Robertson has pointed out,6' other than the creating

couple, the only claimant to a right of ownership or dominion over the
embryos would be the treating medical facility. And certainly the latter
may demand partial or total control over the embryos as a condition of
providing its services. But in most cases, control would best be left to
the creators, just as we do with the production of other new products. 62
When someone stores his or her blood, sperm, or ova, we are quite
comfortable giving the creator control over its use or disposition. An
embryo is simply a slightly more advanced form of genetic material.
We need not classify embryos as "property" in order to recognize a
right in the creators that is comparable to the ownership of property.
There should clearly be "a right of dominion: a right to possess, use or

58. Stanford P. Berenbaum, Davis v. Davis: Frozen Embryos and the Thawing of Procreative
Liberties, 36 WAYNE L. REV. 1337, 1347 (1990).
59. Alise R. Panitch, The Davis Dilemma: How to Prevent Battles Over Frozen Embryos, 41
CASE W. REs. L. REv. 543, 553 (1991) (citing an ethical statement of the American Fertility
Society).
60. Laurence E. Sweeney, "Chilling" The ProcreationalChoice: Frozen Embryos - Who Gets
What When the Donor Couple Divorce, 25 NEW ENG. L. REV. 367, 377 n.56 (1990).
61. Robertson, supra note 10, at 458.
62. Id.

98

DIcKINSON LAW REVIEW

FALL 1993

dispose of something to one's own pleasure., 63 The creators should be
free to discard or destroy an embryo, just as they may destroy a fetus in
an abortion. They should also be free to sell or donate an embryo, just
as they may do with sperm or blood.
B. During the Marriage of the Creating Couple
A woman who has gone through the procedures to generate and
remove ova from her body has more invested in the reproductive process
than a man who merely provides his sperm by ejaculating. Despite this
fact, the difference does not seem sufficient to warrant any inequality of
interest in an embryo at the in vitro stage, since "the woman's bodily
integrity is not at issue, and both have an equal genetic link" to the
embryo.6
Assuming the medical facility providing the treatment does not
object, a couple commencing IVF procedures should be free to provide
in the agreement that, if all of their embryos are not implanted in the
woman's body with the consent of both, and the parties do not mutually
agree to their continued preservation, any remaining embryos will be: (1)
put in the sole custody of a specified member of the couple, to be used
or disposed of at his or her sole discretion; (2) destroyed; (3) donated or
sold to the medical facility to be used or disposed of at its sole discretion;
or (4) donated or sold in a manner specified in the agreement. The
parties will continue to be able to use or dispose of the embryo if they
agree, but it is vitally important that they decide in advance what result
they prefer in the event of a future failure to agree. They can then be
sure that their initial wishes will be honored, and there will be certainty
as to the consequences if they do not agree in the future.
One would hope that most couples engaging in IVF will share the
same goals and philosophies about child-bearing, and will remain in
agreement when choices or changes must be made along the way. Yet
it is inevitable that some disagreements will arise, and a pre-existing
binding agreement will provide an ultimate solution if all else fails. In
many cases it may provide an incentive for a couple to come to an
agreement where the option mandated by the agreement is undesirable to
both.

63. Martin & Lagod, supra note 10, at 268.
64. Martin & Lagod, supra note 10, at 289. This is in contrast to decisions concerning abortion,
which do involve a woman's bodily integrity. Id.
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C. Divorce
While disagreements may well arise during the time a couple is
living together, it is even more likely that there will be disagreements if
the couple separates or divorces. 65 It is quite possible that the default
option which would apply in the event of disagreement while the couple
was living together is not the option that they would elect in the event of
disagreement at the time of divorce. In many cases the agreement will
probably require discard or destruction of all embryos, as the parties will
not want any future genetic offspring. However, some may want to
provide that all embryos be given to the man, or the woman, or divided
equally between them. Such a choice may depend in part on the
likelihood of one or both wanting and being able to conceive a child with
a future partner.
If the couple's agreement provides that, at the time of divorce, any
remaining embryos will be sold or donated for adoption, given to one of
the parties, or divided between them, the agreement (supported by
appropriate legislation)6 should provide that the non-rearing party or
parties will be relieved of any responsibilities or burdens in regard to
custody, financial support, and inheritance. 67
D. Death
Even with normal coital reproduction, it is not uncommon for a child
to be born after the death of one parent, or to be orphaned at an early
age. Thus there should be no valid objection to allowing an IVF embryo
to be subject to use or disposition by a surviving member of the creating
couple, or to pass by will or contract upon the death of both parents.
In most cases the creating couple will probably want the survivor of
them, upon the death of the other, to have exclusive control over the use
and disposition of the embryos, as would be true with an embryo in utero
where birth occurs after the death of the father or shortly before the death
of the mother. Whatever disposition the creating couple desires,
legislation should allow the couple to specify their choice in the
6
agreement they make with the treating medical facility.
Similarly, provisions should be made in the agreement for
disposition of any in vitro embryos upon the death of both creators. In

65. It is likely that most couples involved in IVF will be married. However, in an age when
many children are born out of wedlock, there is no reason to exclude unmarried couples from
participating in IVF.
66. See infra Part VI.B.
67. Cuva, supra note 55, at 414.
68. See infra Part VI.B.
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most cases the couple will agree to either destroy the embryo or to
transfer it (by sale or donation) to another couple for implantation' or
to the medical facility for research. Occasionally it may be desirable to
provide that an embryo will pass by contract or will to a person or couple
who will agree in advance to implant the embryo and raise the resulting
child. In such a case, it may be the wish of the creating couple to leave
some or all of their assets to their posthumous child. There should be no
societal objection to this, so long as the agreement (and relevant statutes)
require that the child-heir be born shortly after the death of the creating
couple - perhaps within two years. °
E. Agreement With Treating Medical Facility
As I have discussed above,7 there should be a clear and
comprehensive agreement between the couple creating the embryos and
the medical facility that provides the IVF treatment. The medical facility
should be completely free to only allow the couple to choose the
alternatives that the medical facility deems wise or desirable. The
medical facility may have religious or other objections to certain options,
such as discard or use for research.72
Besides deciding what options it will make available such as transfer
or withdrawal of embryos, sale or adoption, use for research, or
destruction, the medical facility may also want to set time limits for
preserving embryos. Another potential concern is providing for the
disposition of the embryos if the couple fails to either pay the facility's
fees or keep the facility informed of their address.
Within the framework of those options that the medical facility
chooses to make available the participating couple should have complete
control over the other aspects of the IVF process. In what was probably
the first case directly dealing with a dispute between a participating
couple and a medical facility over control of a frozen embryo, the court
in York v. Jones7 3 held that the couple had principal control over the
embryo. Further, the court held that the couple's complaint alleging that

69. In such case the agreement and any relevant statutes should provide that any resulting child
will not inherit from the creating couple. See infra Part VI.B.
70. See infra Part VI.B.
71. See supra Part III.D.
72. Many Roman Catholics, for example, would object to both. Also, some medical facilities
might not make such options available because they wish to avoid the wrath of and conflict with antichoice, or so-called "right-to-life," groups. Robertson, supra note 51, at 977.
73. 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989).
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the clinic refused to allow them to transfer the embryo to another facility
stated a cause of action for breach of contract and detinue.74
In most cases, the creating couple should be free to transfer their
embryos to another facility at any time. If this will result in some loss
or disadvantage to the original facility, it can provide in the agreement for
an appropriate transfer fee. Also, in most cases, the couple should have
the right at any time to withdraw the embryos from the facility and
dispose of them in any way they wish. While some facilities may try to
require that all embryos be implanted in the creating woman or another,
such a requirement is largely a practical futility. As I have said before,
in that situation a woman could simply have the embryo implanted in her
uterus and immediately have it aborted. It would not make sense to force
a woman into unnecessary health risks and substantial expense.75
The agreement should set a maximum length of time for
cryopreservation of embryos. While some medical facilities have a policy
of keeping frozen embryos indefinitely in order to avoid conflict with
anti-abortion activists,76 with present technology, a frozen embryo will
deteriorate "over time to a point at which it can no longer survive
implantation."" Except for this practical limitation, there is no reason
not to provide for preservation for at least the lifetimes of both creating
parents, 8 and probably for a short time thereafter,79 if that is the
couple's wish.
It is quite possible that many couples will choose to sell or donate
embryos created in the IVF process if they decide not to or are unable to
use the embryos themselves. Some creating couples might want to know
the identity of the receiving couple, as is common in private adoptions.
Others may prefer that their embryos be put in a pool of anonymous
embryos for subsequent sale or donation.
The principal objection to sale or donation of unused embryos is that
the creating couple will suffer emotional and psychological injury in
knowing that they may have a genetic child somewhere whom they do
not know. Those who fear such a reaction need not include this method
of disposition in their agreement. For others, there will be little if any

74. Id.
75. Tzivia Schwartz, Frozen Embryos: The Constitution on Ice, 19 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 267,
280-81 (1985).
76. Browne & Hynes, supra note 28, at 101.
77. Id.
78. Some would limit storage to the period "equivalent to the natural reproductive capabilities
of the couple." Schwartz, supra note 75, at 282. However, many men father children late in life,
and women frequently bear children at fairly advanced ages.
79. A short posthumous period will avoid difficult problems of inheritance. See supra Part V.D.
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concern over the possibility of an unknown genetic child.,s Many
people give up children for adoption without later pangs of remorse. And
some men, especially in the armed forces overseas, know or suspect that
they have fathered children and feel no harmful effects therefrom.
The other primary objections to the sale or donation of embryos are:
(1) problems of inheritance, which can be dealt with in the agreement and
by statute; 8' and (2) having a child seek out his or her genetic parents
in the future. As to the latter, most states now provide for nondisclosure
of birth certificate information in adoption situations, and it should be
nondisclosure of information about an embryo in an
even easier to assure
82
anonymous pool.
For those creating couples who cannot or will not use their own
embryos, yet do not want them sold or donated for implantation, there is
the option of selling or donating their embryos for use in research. While
some will have religious or other objections to this option and will feel
that destruction of the embryos is the only viable8 3 alternative, others
will recognize the substantial social value in providing research
material."'
There are many positive gains that can result from research with
embryos, among which are: (1) improved IVF techniques; (2) more
effective means of birth control; (3) learning about genetic defects and
Other
problems; and (4) detection and prevention of cancer.85
possibilities include providing nervous tissue for transplants into humans,
developing individual organs for transplants, 6 or "test[ing] the effects
of toxic substances or new drugs on early fetal development.""
F. Should the Agreement be Modifiable?
It should certainly be permissible to change any provision in the
agreement if both members of the creating couple and the medical facility
agree, assuming the provision when changed is not contrary to law.
However, in the absence of such a three-way consensus, all provisions in
80. Many embryos, even if implanted, will not result in a live birth. See supra text
accompanying note 9.
81. See, e.g., Bielawski, supra note 3, at 283, and statute cited therein.
82. Bielawski, supra note 3, at 283.
83. Pun intended.
84. The question of whether embryos should be created solely for research purposes is beyond
the scope of this article. See Robertson, supra note 51, at 984-85. However, consistent with the
other views expressed in this article, it should be acceptable for a couple to create embryos and give
them to a research facility, just as they might give their blood, semen, or tissue.
85. Robertson, supra note 10, at 503.
86. Gregoratos, supra note 40, at 983.
87. Id.
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the agreement should be final and binding because the parties have
entered into the agreement in reliance on its being binding and
irrevocable. In fact, to make it unlikely that the agreement will be later
modified by a court under the doctrine of "fundamentally changed
circumstances," it would probably be wise to include in the agreement an
express statement that the parties recognize that circumstances may
change in the future and that they waive any right they might have to
seek modification of the agreement on that basis. 8
VI. Statutory Provisions
A. If There is No Pre-TreatmentAgreement
Even though it may be required by statute that no IVF treatment or
storing of embryos may be undertaken without an agreement between the
couple and the medical facility, realistically we must recognize that some
people will violate the law, and it will be necessary to determine the use
and disposition of embryos when the parties themselves cannot agree.
There should be a statute providing that when the creating couple is in
agreement, their decision will override any disagreement by the medical
facility. The creating couple starts with complete authority over their
embryos, and they should retain that authority until they clearly relinquish
it. 89 If the medical facility wanted to limit the rights of the couple, it
could have done so before treatment was commenced.
The more difficult part of a default statute will deal with disputes
between the couple. What if one wants to use or keep the embryos and
the other wants to destroy them? There should be no problem regarding
the financial obligation of an unwilling genetic parent since the statute
can expressly provide that the unwilling parent will have no obligation to
a resulting child in terms of financial support, inheritance, custody, or
otherwise.'
However, the unwilling parent is still exposed to the
psychosocial burden of knowing that an unwanted child may exist, 9'
perhaps growing up in the same community where the unwilling parent
lives.
If the member of the creating couple who wishes to use or keep the
embryos has a reasonable opportunity and likelihood of being able to
reproduce with a new partner, through IVF or otherwise, it seems best to

88.
89.
90.
note 10,
91.

See Robertson, supra note 7, at 411.
See Robertson, supra note 10, at 473.
Similar statutory provisions apply to artificial insemination donors. See Robertson, supra
at 477.
See id.
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honor the wishes of the unwilling partner and destroy the embryos.'
However, because of the expense involved, and the physical burden in the
case of the woman, it seems fair to impose perhaps half of the anticipated
cost of future treatment on the unwilling partner.
If, on the other hand, the partner who wishes to use or keep the
embryos has no reasonable likelihood of reproductive opportunity with
a new partner, the interest of the person wishing to enjoy the pleasures
and satisfactions of parenthood should outweigh any psychological
discomfort of the unwilling partner, 93 especially if all financial
obligations are statutorily negated.
Finally, if one partner wishes to sell or donate the embryos, either
to another couple or for research, the wishes of the unwilling partner
should prevail. There is no reason to impose even a slight psychological
burden when the other person does not want to raise the child that will
be produced. 94
B. Statutory Provisions Needed to Support a Pre-Treatment
Agreement
1. Inheritance.-It is quite common for the probate law of a state
to permit a person conceived before but born after a parent's death to
inherit by will or intestacy.95 In the case of a frozen embryo, this makes
it theoretically possible for a child to assert an inheritance claim many
years after the death of one or both parents, and this could impact
severely on the orderly and efficient settlement of estates. 9, As I have
discussed above, 97 there should not be any greater societal objection to
inheritance by a posthumous child born as a result of IVF than there is
to the posthumous inheritance of a child conceived coitally. However, to
simplify the settlement of estates, it would be best to limit the inheritance
rights of a posthumous child to a fairly short period, perhaps two years.98

92. See Ahnen, supra note 46, at 1327-28.
93. As I have discussed previously in Part V.E, for many people this discomfort will be minimal
or non-existent.
94. See Ahnen, supra note 46, at 1327; Robertson, supra note 10, at 481.
95. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 6150 (West. Supp. 1990). But see LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art.
29 (West 1950), which provides that an embryo must be in utero when the parent dies for the
resulting child to inherit.
96. Mark A. Pieper, Frozen Embryos - Persons or Property?: Davis v. Davis. 23 CREIGHTON
L. REv. 807, 831 (1990).
97. See supra Part III.D.4.
98. The Rule Against Perpetuities allows an interest in property to vest up to 21 years after a
life in being at the time of creation of the interest. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1331 (6th ed. 1990).
Such a long period would be impractical in the in vitro situation.
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2. Relief From ParentalResponsibility.-Justas the law imposes no
obligation of financial support on a sperm or egg donor, 99 a member of
an embryo-creating couple who does not want the embryos used or saved
should be statutorily relieved of any financial obligation if the other
partner is permitted to use the embryos. The using partner is making a
free choice, with full knowledge that he or she will bear the full
responsibility for the support of the child, and in return it is only fair that
the partner who wishes to avoid parenthood should be relieved of all
parental responsibilities." ° The same should be true if one or both
partners wish to sell or donate the embryo for adoption or research. Just
as the law protects genetic parents from any further obligations when a
child is given up for adoption, a statute should relieve the creators of an
embryo of responsibility when the embryo is sold or donated.
3. Allow for Sale or Adoption.-While most people do not consider
embryos in vitro to be property, embryos should be subject to control by
their creators as to their use and disposition."° ' Statutes should allow
for the adoption of embryos according to exactly the same rules that
apply to the adoption of a child. And while there is some opposition to
allowing the sale of embryos,"° there is no logical reason to treat
embryos any differently from other renewable human matter, such as
blood or sperm. In view of the very substantial expense involved in the
in vitro creation of embryos, it seems quite reasonable to allow the
creators to recoup all or part of their investment by selling unused
embryos for implantation by others, or for research. Those who are
opposed to selling embryos on religious or other grounds need not
participate in such a transaction. But the law should permit sales for
those who do not have religious or other objections.
VII. Conclusion
In vitro fertilization is providing wonderful new opportunities for
otherwise infertile couples to have children, and for other couples to have
children at the optimum time. In light of the experience we have
gathered it is now possible, and highly desirable, to anticipate most of the
problems that can arise, and to provide solutions and answers in advance,
both by agreement of the parties involved and by supporting statutes.

99.

100.
101.
102.

See, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5(b), 9B U.L.A. 301 (1987).

Ahnen, supra note 46, at 1329.
See supra Part V.A.
See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9:122 (West 1986).

